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Abstract: This paper presents a new approach in plant modeling for the formal 
verification of real time systems. A system composed by two tanks is used, where all its 
components are modeled by simple modules and all the interdependences of the 
system’s modular models are presented. As innovating parameters in the plant 
modeling, having as purpose its use on formal verification tasks, the plant is modeled 
using Dymola software and Modelica programming language. The results obtained in 
simulation are used to define the plant models that are used for the formal verification 
tasks, using the model-checker UPPAAL. The paper presents, in a more detailed way, 
the part of this work that is related to formal verification, being pointing out the used 
plant modeling approach. Copyright © 2007 IFAC 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Safety control has, as its main goal, the assurance of 
the requirements of reliability, availability, and 
maintainability of automated systems1. Because of its 
direct impact on people and goods safety, the 
reliability of critical systems (transports, space, 
nuclear,...) has, since some time, mobilized the 
scientific community efforts. To assure the safety of 
a system, it is necessary to use a global approach (to 
guarantee that weaknesses do not exist) that takes 
into account a set of engineering activities and, later, 
after entering into functioning, the set of activities of 
exploitation and maintainability under conditions of 
operational exploitation of the system. Thus, the 
                                                 
1 This research project is carried out in the context of the 
SCAPS Project supported by FCT, the Portuguese 
Foundation for Science and Technology, and FEDER, the 
European regional development fund, under contract 
POCI/EME/61425/2004 that deals with safety control of 
automated production systems. 
scientific community makes an effort to find, for the 
engineers, models, methods and tools, having as 
complementary objectives to anticipate possible 
predictions of malfunctioning. 
Among the several techniques of industrial 
controllers analysis there are distinguished, for its 
utility, Simulation (Baresi et al. 2000) and Formal 
Verification (Moon, 1994). In the research works on 
industrial controllers analysis, these two techniques 
are rarely used simultaneously. If Simulation is faster 
to execute, has the limitation of considering only 
some system behavior evolution scenarios. Using 
Formal Verification has the advantage of testing all 
the possible system behavior evolution scenarios but, 
sometimes, it has the limitation of the time necessary 
for the attainment of formal verification results. This 
paper shows, how it is possible, and desirable, to 
conciliate these two techniques in the analysis of 
industrial controllers. With the simultaneous use of 
these two techniques, the developed industrial 
controllers are more robust and not subject to errors. 
     
This paper is focused on the formal verification of 
timed systems.  
There are several approaches to applying formal 
verification techniques (not considering timed 
aspects) on automation systems dependability: from 
the formal verification by theorem proving (Roussel 
and Denis, 2002) to formal verification by model-
checking (Rossi, 2004) and considering (Machado et 
al. 2006), or not (Rossi, 2004), a plant model. In the 
formal verification of timed systems there are several 
approaches to increase the obtained results in proving 
properties. Between these works there are 
distinctions between the work by (Remelhe et al. 
2004), where the translation of IEC 61131-3 SFC 
into timed automata is studied, and the work by 
(Gaid et al. 2005) where a way for constructing the 
controller model is proposed, using the initial 
approach proposed by (Mader and Wupper, 1999), 
and some work hypotheses related with the controller 
model evolution and with time aspects, that increase 
the obtained results on formal verification tasks.  
In this work we are adopting the base system and the 
work hypothesis considered by (Gaid et al. 2005) for 
the controller behavior and we propose a way to 
build plant timed models. To achieve our goals, in 
this work, the paper is organized as follows. Section 
1, presents the challenge proposed in this work. 
Section 2 is devoted to the general presentation of the 
case study involving a system with two tanks, a 
heating device, level control sensors and valves to 
control the liquids flow and it presents also the 
methodology to obtain the controller program 
deduced from a specification of the system desired 
behavior. Section 3 is entirely dedicated to plant 
modeling, being presented the adopted approach. 
Next (section 4) a set of system behavior properties 
to prove is provided and also its formalization using 
TCTL. Section 5 presents and discusses the obtained 
results on formal verification using the model-
checker UPPAAL and, finally, section 6, presents 
some conclusions and future work. 
2. CASE STUDY 
In this work a modified version of the benchmark 
example for an behavior evaporator system presented 
by (Kowalewski et al. 2001) and (Huuck et al. 2001) 
is used. The system (Fig. 1) consists of two tanks 
(one of them is heated and mixed), a condenser, level 
sensors and on-off valves (Vi). In the normal 
operation mode the system works as follows. Tank1 
is filled with two solutions by opening valves V1 and 
V2. Then, the mixer starts working in order to 
promote the dilution. After two time units, the heated 
device is switched on for 20 time units to increase 
temperature solution. During this period part of the 
liquid is evaporated and cooled by the condenser. At 
that point the required liquid concentration has been 
reached and the heater is switched off. The remaining 
liquid is drained to tank2 by opening valve V3. The 
mixing device is switched off when tank1 is empty. 
The solution stays in tank2 for post-processing, to 
stay liquid, for 32 time units and then valve V4 is 
open to empty tank2. 
 
Fig. 1. Evaporator system. Closed-loop system 
composed by controller and plant. 
Throughout normal operation mode, the system may 
malfunction. During evaporation, the condenser may 
fail: the steam can not be cooled and the pressure 
inside the condenser rises. Therefore, the heater must 
be switched off to avoid the condenser explosion. By 
doing so, the temperature of tank1 decreases and the 
solution may become solid and can not be drained in 
tank2. Hence, valve V3 must be opened early 
enough, but after opening first valve V4, for 
preventing tank2 overflow. 
In the case of a condenser malfunction, we also need 
to guarantee some response times of the control 
program, taking into account the timing 
characteristics of the physical devices: 
- whenever a condenser malfunction starts, the 
condenser can explode if steam is produced 
during 22 time units; 
- if the heating device is switched off, the steam 
production stops after 12 time units; 
- if no steam is produced in tank 1, the solution 
may solidify after 19 time units; 
- emptying tank 2 takes between 0 and 26 time 
units; 
- emptying tank 1 can be very fast with respect 
to the other durations, so that it is considered 
instantaneous; 
- filling tank 1 takes at most 6 time units. 
     
2.1 Controller specification 
As we use the Simulation and Formal Verification, 
using different tools and intending to conciliate the 
obtained results, we adopted a controller 
specification that is the same for the basis of the 
controller program in the two analysis techniques. 
Thus, the controller specification was developed in 
IEC 60848 SFC because it can be used as the basis 
for the development of the Programmable Logic 
Controller program (PLC), to be verified with 
UPPAAL based on timed automata (Alur and Dill, 
1990), and also it is the basis for the controller 
program to be used by StateGraphs Modelica library 
(Otter et al. 2005). 
The input and output variables of the controller 
model are summarized on Table 1; minimum and 
maximum level sensors and malfunction sensor are 
considered as inputs and on-off valves and Heater, 
Mixer and Alarm are controller program outputs. 
Table 1 Input and output variables of the controller 
program 
Inputs Outputs 
T1F-  tank1 full  V1- valve 1 
T1E-  tank1 empty V2 - valve 2 
T2F - tank2 full V3 – valve 3 
T2E - tank2 empty V4 – valve 4 
Malf - condenser malfunction H- heater 
 MR – mixer 
 Alarm 
 
 
Fig. 2. IEC 60848 SFC specification of the 
controller program. 
In order to guarantee the desired behavior for the 
described system, a IEC 60848 SFC specification is 
presented on Fig. 2. As IEC 60848 SFC is a 
specification language (and not a programming one), 
it is necessary to translate the SFC specification, first 
to a StateGraph program, presented in (Seabra et al. 
2007) and, second, to translate it into a program 
written in a PLC programming language (in this case 
it will be used the ladder language).  
3. PLANT MODELLING 
The interesting point about the plant modeling was 
that it consisted of two steps: first, to model the plant 
using Dymola  software and Modelica programming 
language (Elmqvist and Mattson, 1997), and, then, to 
use the obtained models as a basis for the 
development of the UPPAAL (David et al. 2003) 
models which are used on the formal verification 
tasks. We consider the following eight modules for 
the plant modeling: Tank1, Tank2, Heater, Mixer, 
Alarm, Steam, Condenser and Liquid. As this work is 
devoted to formal verification tasks, only the case of 
tank1, modeled using Modelica programming 
Language, and the corresponding UPPAAL model 
are presented. All the plant is modeled using 
Modelica programming language in (Seabra et al. 
2007). It is remembered that the most important 
information that is taken into account is the set of 
simulation functioning delays that are obtained by 
simulation. These delays are, afterwards, used for the 
formal verification tasks, in order to define the time 
units used in the modules of the plant model. 
3.1 Model of tank1  
The model of tank1 is, first, simulated with Dymola, 
presented as Modelica code in Fig. 3. 
 
Fig. 3. Modelica code for the tank1 model. 
     
The obtained delays on simulation were used on 
formal verification with UPPAAL. The 
corresponding model of the tank developed in 
UPPAAL for formal verification purposes is 
presented in Fig. 4. 
 
Fig. 4. UPPAAL model of the tank1. 
We consider four states: empty models that tank1 is 
empty; filling models that the liquid is entering in 
tank1; full models that tank1 is full; state overflow is 
also considered, this is a possible state for the tank, 
but describes an undesired behavior. In this model, it 
is also considered that the tank1 is emptied in a very 
short time, when compared with the filling time. We 
have considered this time null. It is for that reason 
that the model goes from the full state directly to the 
empty state, without an intermediate state. The 
Boolean variables T1E and T1F are associated with 
tank1.empty and tank1.full, respectively. These 
variables represent the level sensors’ signals sent by 
the sensors from the plant to the controller. The 
maximum time for filling tank1 is six time units. 
3.2   Model of tank2 
The model of tank2 is similar at the tank1 model and 
the reasoning followed to obtain this model was the 
same as presented before for obtaining the tank1 
model. As empting tank1 is considered to take a short 
(null) time, the filling of the tank2 is done in the 
same conditions, since the liquid is transferred from 
tank1 to tank2. Four states are considered: empty, 
full, emptying and overflow, which is a possible state 
for the tank, but describes an undesired behavior. The 
variables T2E and T2F have the same behavior on 
the tank2 model as the T1E and T1F described above 
on the tank1 model. Empty tank2 takes, at maximum, 
twenty-six time units. 
3.3 Models of Heater Mixer and Alarm 
The reasoning adopted for building these three 
models is the same for all of them and consists in 
considering two states for each one: off (as initial 
state for all of them) and on that models that 
respective orders sent from the controller to the plant 
are actives. In Fig. 5 is presented the model of the 
mixer, for illustration of all these three models.  
 
Fig. 5. Model of the mixer 
3.4 Model of the condenser 
The model of the condenser, presented in Fig. 6, is 
composed by five states: the state good models the 
good functioning of the condenser; the state 
malfunction_heater models that the condenser is 
malfunctioning and the heater is in state on; the state 
malfunction_not_heater models that the condenser is 
malfunctioning but the heater has been switched off; 
the state before_explosion models the behavior where 
it is not possible to avoid the condenser explosion 
and the state explosion models the behavior of the 
condenser explosion. 
 
Fig. 6. Model of the condenser  
In the behavior described in the case study it is 
presented that the condenser may explode if it is in 
malfunctioning behavior and if steam exists for 
during twenty-two time units after that. In this case, 
if the system behavior is the same as described in the 
malfunction_heater state (the heater is in the on state) 
during ten time units, then the condenser will explode 
because we will have steam at least for more twelve 
time units which implies that the condenser will 
explode (twenty-two time units after). The 
malfunction behavior happens in a random way from 
the state good of the condenser model: we have 
added to the condenser model a Boolean variable 
Malf that indicates that behavior. 
     
3.5 Model of the steam 
One of the hardest tasks on plant modeling is to 
model plant products (as the case of steam) because 
these models are specific for each plant. In this case, 
and taking into account the above described behavior 
for the system, the model of steam is extremely 
useful to allow us to prove some system behavior 
properties. We, thus consider three states for the 
model: state off models that steam does not exist; 
state on_heat_on models that steam exists and the 
heater is also in state on (the model of the steam is 
dependent of the model of the heater) and state 
on_heat_off models that steam exists but the heater is 
in the off state. We remember that after the heater 
switches off, steam exists during twelve time units. 
We have introduced the Boolean variable steam_var 
that indicates when steam exists or not. 
 
Fig. 7. Model of the steam 
3.6 Model of the liquid 
As the steam model presented before, the model of 
the liquid is also a specific model related with a plant 
product. 
 
Fig. 8. Model of the liquid 
This model has been created from the point of view 
of the presence of liquid in tank1 to look at its 
behavior regarding the solidification state of the 
liquid, possible in tank1. From point of view of the 
presence of liquid on tank1, Fig. 8, we have three 
possibilities: there is no liquid in tank1, modeled by 
state no_liquid_1; there is liquid in tank1 and the 
liquid is heating, modeled by the state 
liquid_heat_on; there is liquid in tank1 and  the 
liquid is not heating, modeled by state 
liquid_heat_off;  and there is liquid in tank1 that 
changed to the solid state after thirty-one time units 
(these thirty-one time units mean that the liquid 
solidifies after nineteen time units after the absence 
of steam; we remember that after the heater is 
switched off, the steam is present for more twelve 
time units). 
We point out that, for all the models, we have 
adapted the simulation conditions to obtain the same 
delays proposed on (Gaid et al. 2005), in order to 
have a basis to compare the formal verification 
results obtained. 
4. SYSTEM BEHAVIOR PROPERTIES AND 
PROPERTIES FORMALIZATION 
In order to express the properties in UPPAAL  
syntax, we need a small part of TCTL formalism 
(Alur et al., 1993). In the formulas below which are 
all (possibly timed) invariants, A is the universal 
quantifier on paths: for any path…, and [ ] means 
always… The combination A [ ] means for all states 
in  the future…  
The properties that we intend to prove are: 
- P1: To prevent tank 1 from damage by 
overheating, it must be checked that the tank 
is full when the heater is working. 
- P2: During the evaporation step, steam can 
leave tank 1 into the condenser only when the 
heater is on and the valves V1, V2 and V3 are 
closed. 
- P3: To prevent uncontrolled liquid flow, the 
input and output valves of a tank must not be 
simultaneously open. 
- P4: Condenser must not explode. 
- P5: Solution must not solidify in tank 1. 
- P6: Tank1 must not overflow. 
- P7: Tank2 must not overflow. 
The properties are formalized as follows, using 
TCTL: 
- P1: A[ ] (H imply T1F); 
- P2: A[ ] (H imply (not (V1) and not (V2) and 
not (V3))); 
- P3: A[ ] not (((V1 || V2) and V3) or (V3 and 
V4)); 
- P4: A[ ] not condenser.explosion 
- P5: A[ ] not liquid.solid 
- P6: A[ ] not tank1.overflow 
- P7: A[ ] not tank2.overflow 
5. FORMAL VERIFICATION 
The adopted strategy for formal verification 
considers that the program is written in Ladder 
language (according section 2) and some work 
hypotheses, as presented on (Gaid et al. 2005): 
- the PLC executes the control program with a 
three phases cyclic behavior;  
- there are considered timer blocks IEC 61131-3 
TON;  
- the duration of PLC cycle is considered to be 
between ε1 and ε2 and we have adopted ε1 
     
equal to 0 and ε2 equal to 1; 
- the unit of time used for the plant is irrelevant; 
- discovering the maximal value of ε2 for the 
properties to hold was not our objective. 
The controller and the plant models, coupled as a 
closed-loop system, compose the global model 
verified. All the properties were verified in less than 
2 seconds each, using. UPPAAL version 4.0.3 and an 
Intel Core Duo, 1,87GHz, machine with 4GB of 
RAM. The modular approach to building the plant 
model is well suited to facilitate the tasks of writing 
the properties, as is the case of properties P4, P5, P6 
and P7.  
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The presented way to build plant models, from an 
automation system, is useful for two important 
points: first, we can avoid, using simulation, a set of 
program errors in reduced time intervals which 
would not happen if these errors were detected only 
through the use of formal verification techniques and, 
second, our modular approach allow us an easier way 
to build plant models which is well suited to facilitate 
the tasks of writing the properties formulae. The 
consideration of undesirable states on the created 
plant models allows us an easier writing of 
properties.  
The use of Modelica programming language, to 
obtain these modular plant models, is useful to define 
the delays in which a property can, or cannot, be 
proved and the delays to elaborate the considered 
plant models.  
The simulation techniques allow us to test different 
delays of the plant functioning and to see if a 
property, for different considered delays, is still true 
or if different delays imply that a property that is 
true, for a delay, will become false for another.  This 
study is not presented in this work but it is very 
important from the point of view of system safety. 
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